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Sinkler: Constitutional Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
HUGER SINK=EI*

Bill of Rights
The defendant in State v. Pearson' had been on trial,
charged, as a second offender, with operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicants. The question in the
case involves the admissibility of the magistrate's report, made
pursuant to statutory directive, to establish the defendant's
prior conviction for drunken driving. Several questions were
disposed of by the Court. It upheld the report as a public document and admissible as such. In this connection, it pointed
out that the admissibility of public documents in evidence was
an exception to the Hearsay Rule. To reach this result, it
first denied that the magistrate's trial docket was the "best
evidence" of the prior conviction. Apparently only these two
questions had been raised in the Court below, but on appeal,
the defendant contended that he had been deprived of his
constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against
2
him.
While the Court noted that the constitutional question was
not properly before them, they undertook to dispose of it in
any event. The Court held that the provisions of the Bill of
Rights guaranteeing the right of the accused in all criminal
prosecutions to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses
had never been extended to the point where it permitted the
exclusion of proper documentary evidence. Accordingly, the
Court held that that portion of the record relating to the former conviction or guilty plea of the defendant was admissible. However, the Court refused to pass upon the question
as to whether other facts set forth in the record (such as the
identity of the person of the defendant) was admissible. Thus
does the Court seem to invite further litigation on this question. One wonders why one portion of the document might
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be admissible and another part inadmissible, since the admissibility of the document in evidence does not prevent the introduction of evidence to challenge its correctness as to any
particular. Perhaps in some later case, when the identity of
the person convicted of drunken driving is at issue, the question suggested by the Court will be raised and disposed of.
For the second time during the past year our Court had occasion to consider the effect of the provision in the Bill of
Rights8 guaranteeing, to one accused of crime, the right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him. In State v. Corn,4
the question was raised by a convicted defendant who sought a
new trial on the ground of after-discovered evidence. Specifically, the question was raised when the State offered affidavits
countering those offered by the appealing defendant. The
Court noted that the constitutional provision did not apply to
motions for new trials. To sustain this holding, the Court
quoted at length from both State and U. S. Supreme Court decisions.
State v. FloydG is another of a rather large number of cases
decided in the past year in which convicted defendants asserted that they had been deprived of rights guaranteed to
them by the Bill of Rights. No important declaration of principle is to be found in this case, but it does involve an interesting application of the principle that a confession, to be admissible, must be voluntarily made. In this case, the Court
found upon the record that it was exceedingly doubtful
whether the confession had in fact been voluntarily made, and
unhesitatingly set aside the conviction. On the basis of the
facts as they are set forth in the opinion, we have no quarrel
with the Court's holding. The opinion reads:
Here we have a boy 17 years old, charged with a crime,
the punishment for which could be death by electrocution,
being questioned by armed officers of the law, but in the
main by one particular officer who finally typed a statement which he prepared for the appellant's signature, at
intervals from 6:30 A.M. to 1:30 P.M., and who was at
least called a liar several times by the officer, and with
this officer cursing, talking in a loud voice, and slapping
his hands together in an excitable manner soon after the
3. See note 2.
4. 224 S.C. 74, 77 S.E. 2d 354 (1953).
5. 223 S.C. 413, 76 S.E. 2d 291 (1953).
6. U. S. CONsT. AMEND. I to X inclusive.
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appellant was arrested, and without the appellant having
had the opportunity of conferring with a friend or any
members of his family. In the space of time indicated
hereinabove a most damaging statement is signed, and one
contrary to the testimony of the appellant upon his trial.
Upon a careful analysis of the testimony in reference
to the procurement of this confession, we cannot erase
from our minds the probability that this boy was overawed by the treatment he received at Olanta by Officer
Hobbs, and by being surrounded by armed officers in
Sumter, and therefore signed what he knew would satisfy
Hobbs. The Trial Judge had no precedent of a decided
case of closely similar facts to govern him, and had to
make a 'snap judgment' decision, whereas we have been
able to give the issue mature thought; and upon doing
so, we have reached the conclusion that this alleged confession was so tainted, it should have been excluded.
Purposefor Which PublicFunds May Be Used
The case, Caldweli v. McMillan,1 is a general attack upon
the validity of the legislation authorizing, and the subsequent
actions of the State Highway Department in constructing and
operating a cafeteria in the new State Highway Department
Building in Columbia, which is designed to serve employees
and officials of the State. It is, of course, an important principle of constitutional law that State expenditures must be for
public purposes. The great majority of cases where this question is raised are those relating to the issuance of bonds. Here,
however, is one of the infrequent cases where a taxpayer concerns himself with a legislative enactment in an adversary
proceeding rather than in the usual test case. His principal
challenge to the act is that the purpose of the expenditure
authorized is not for a public purpose. The Court finds little
difficulty in disposing of this contention, noting that many
things are now considered to be of public concern which were
in former days considered to lie altogether in the realm of
private concern. In reaching that result, the Court also noted
that the question as to whether the purpose of an act is public
or private is primarily one for determination by the legislative
body, although there does lie in the Courts, the power of review. That principle, however, is very clearly written into the
law of South Carolina.
7. 224 S.C. 150, 77 S.E. 2d 798 (1953).
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Limitations on State's Debt
In an earlier edition of this Law Review, 8 the writer discussed constitutional limitations on public finance and reviewed at some length the so-called South Carolina Special
Fund Doctrine. Since the date of that review, two important
and interesting decisions have been handed down, one of which
is the subject case, Arthur v. Byrnes.9
To finance its huge program of public school buildings, the
1951 Legislature levied a three percent sales tax and set up the
proceeds of this tax as the special fund to secure an authorized
$82,500,000 of general obligation bonds of the State. The usual
test suit followed' 0 to determine the validity of the tax, the
sufficiency of the special fund, and of the bonds themselves.
For the first time in any special fund case, it was contended
that the question of whether any particular fund was sufficient to bring it within the purview of the Special Fund Doctrine was a judicial question and not one which might be resolved by the legislative or executive branches of the government. The Court agreed that the determination of the sufficiency of any special fund was "in the nature of a judicial
function." But it held that it might properly be delegated to
executive and administrative officers under the Constitution
"subject to Court review and reversal in proper cases." The
Court noted that if such were not true, then the "thou shalt
not" of a Constitution could be brushed aside by the simple
ipse dixit of the servants thus bound and the mandate of the
Constitution would thus be rendered impotent. The importance of this conclusion is of great significance, for it makes
Court review an essential part of the proceedings in the issuance of special fund bonds.
The subject case is an instance where the Court accepts the
burdens imposed upon it and actually exercises its power of
review. The Legislature had authorized general obligation
bonds of the State, payable primarily from a special fund derived from the tuition fees charged at each of the several institutions of higher learning in the State. It had required
that:
. . . the 'schedule of tuition fees, as applied to the regularly enrolled students at such State Institution, on the
8. 3 S.C.L.Q. 303 (1951).
9. 224 S.C. 51, 77 S.E. 2d 311 (1953).
10. State ex rel. Roddey v. Byrnes, 219 S.C. 485, 66 S.E. 2d 33 (1951).
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basis of the number of students regularly enrolled at such
State Institution at the close of the last preceding academic semester or term (exclusive of any summer school
semester or term), will, if multiplied by the number of
years for which the bonds herein provided for shall be
outstanding, result in the production of a sum equal to
not less than one hundred ten per cent of the estimated
aggregate principal and interest requirements of all State
Institutional Bonds issued for such State Institution to be
outstanding if such application be approved.'
The State Budget and Control Board had decided that the 110
per cent coverage provided in the Act was insufficient and had
adopted a resolution requiring 125 per cent coverage, but even
this did not appeal to the Court which, exercising a very wise
discretion, concluded that the special fund would not be sufficient unless 150 per cent coverage existed. It so ruled.
We shall not extend this discussion with a further review
of our Special Fund Doctrine except to say that the result
which has come about, which makes a judicial branch a necessary participant in proceedings to issue special fund bonds,
was inevitable. The writer seriously doubts if the Court, as
presently constituted, would have ever adopted the Special
Fund Doctrine. Nevertheless, it feels that it is bound to follow that doctrine because of stare decisis.
Special Acts Relating to Venue
In the case, Fordham v. Fordham," the court correctly diagnosed a provision in the Act,12 relating to the Domestic Relations Court for Charleston, which permitted that Court to
assume jurisdiction over a non-resident (of the County) defaulting father and husband, found by chance in Charleston
County, as a special law where a general law was applicable,
and thus invalid as violative of Subdivision 9 of Section 34
of Article III of the State Constitution.
Following a family quarrel, at their home in Berkeley County, the plaintiff, mother and wife, moved to Charleston County
with her children. Thereupon, she instituted this action for
support in the Domestic Relations Court for Charleston County, and secured service upon the defendant while he was in
Charleston on a casual visit. His attempts to resist the juris11. 223 S.C. 401, 76 S.E. 2d 299 (1953).

12. CODE op LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLiNA, 1952
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diction of the Domestic Relations Court were unsuccessful in
that Court and in the Court of Common Pleas, but on appeal
to the Supreme Court, the lower courts were reversed and the
Supreme Court held that the venue provision was invalid as
a special law, where a general law on that subject existed.
Once again the Supreme Court noted that the right of an
individual to be sued in the County of his residence was a valuable right. It also observed, pointedly, that if the lower court's
holdings were correct, a defendant could be sued in any number of counties.
When one recalls that inferior courts, such as the Domestic
Relations Court of Charleston County, may be established
by special enactments, 18 the importance of this holding be-

comes clear.
Delegationof Legislative Power
In State v. Taylor,14 a twofold attack was made upon the
constitutionality of the 1950 Act 5 regulating public livestock
markets:
It requires any person operating a public livestock
market in South Carolina to obtain a permit from the
State Veterinarian. Upon the filing of an application for
such permit and the giving of the required bond, 'the
technical livestock committee, composed of four men appointed by the Board of Trustees of Clemson Agricultural
College and the president, vice-president and secretary of
the Livestock Dealers Association shall make an official
inspection of the premises of each applicant, and if in
their opinion the owner or owners of the proposed market
can comply with the provisions of this Act, the State
Veterinarian shall issue the permit.' 6
The Court construed the defendant's vague first exception
to the validity of the Act as a challenge that the Legislature
could not lawfully confer, on the Board of Trustees of Clemson
College, the power of appointment, and that the livestock dealers association, whose officers were members of the committee, is a private business organization, without any official or
governmental status. In its earlier decision, Ashmore v.
13. S. C. CoNsT. Art. V, § 1.
14. 233 S.C. 526, 77 S.E. 2d 195 (1953).
15. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952

16. See note 14.
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Greater Greenville Sewer District,7 the Court had held that
the power of appointment to public office might not be delegated to unofficial persons or bodies, where the latter were
not rationally and substantially related to the law to be administered by the appointees. In that case, they struck down
appointments made by the service clubs of Greenville to the
Public Auditorium Commission created by the Act, which
had been attacked in the Ashmore case, but still later, the
Court upheld a statute, which provided that two members of
the State Board of Bank Control should be appointed upon the
recommendation of the State Bankers Association, on the
ground that there, the unofficial bodies did have a rational
relation to the law to be administered. In this case, the Court
applied the principle of its holding relating to the State Board
of Bank Control and sustained the legislation. It should be
noted that the second exception taken by the appealing defendant was held too vague and general to be worthy of consideration. This points up the necessity of the appealing lawyer citing both chapter and verse in any attack upon the constitutionality of any Act.
Supreme Court'sPower to Grant Bail
In State v. Whitener,'8 a'majority of the Court held that the
Legislature is without power to enact a statute denying bail
after conviction. The Court first noted that a section of the
1942 Code' 9 had been omitted from the 1952 Code without
legislative authority. From this circumstance, the majority
doubted that it had been the legislative intention to disturb
the statutory law from that which it had been prior to the
adoption of the 1952 Code. Nevertheless, it met the constitutional question squarely, stating:
The legislature has, however, adopted the Code as a
whole in its present form. But even so, the legislature has
no power to take away powers specifically granted to
this Court by the Constitution. One of these powers is
the historic writ of habeas corpus. Such a writ can be
addressed to this Court in its original jurisdiction only
under unusual circumstances, but appellant has presented
to the Court such an occasion.
17. 211 S C. 77, 44 S.E. 2d 88 (1947).
18. 81 S.E. 2d 784 (S.C. 1954).
19. S. C. CODE § 1032 (1942).
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This Court has the power to issue these writs and orders referred to in the Constitution. Those fundamental
remedies and safeguards upon which each individual in
our society has the right to rely must be preserved by the
courts. Otherwise, these procedural rights embodied in
our Constitution to insure the individual against oppression will become nullities.
This Court, the judicial body of last resort in our state
system of jurisprudence, has the inherent power to set
bond in any ease. Every defendant sentenced to ten years
or less has the right to bail pending appeal. This Court
can grant bail, in its discretion, where the sentence exceeds ten years.
The majority opinion is not fortified by decisions of other
courts, and as the provision in the South Carolina Constitution
relating to the separation of powers is substantially similar
to those of other states, this absence of authority weakens the
holding.
The strong dissent cites numerous authorities to support
the view that the statute was constitutional. The dissenters
said:
It is, of course, not illogical to restrict or deny the right
to bail pending appeal from conviction. Before conviction, one charged with crime is clothed with a presumption of innocence; after conviction, the presumption of
innocence is overthrown by verdict and judgment of guilt,
upon which there arises a legal, as well as laical, presumption that the conviction is just, which presumption is not
destroyed or abrogated by appeal. Parker v. State Highway Department, S. C., 78 S. E. 2d 382. In accord with
this concept, our Constitution of 1895, art. I, see. 20, requires the admittance to bail before conviction, with an
exception which is not irrelevant; but contains no provision with respect to bail after conviction of crime. It
thus seems clear that there is no constitutional right
which the above statute violates.
This opinion also takes issue with the statement in the majority opinion that a Section of the 1942 Code had been omitted
from the 1952 Code without authorization. This opinion concludes that a 1944 statute had repealed the particular provision
of the 1942 Code discussed in the majority opinion.
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The question of statutory intent is relatively unimportant,
but the constitutional question is extremely interesting. The
rights of the individual improperly convicted would undoubtedly suffer if such individual is incarcerated while waiting
for the Appellate Court to correct some heinous error resulting
in his conviction. On the other hand, the rights of society
might be seriously jeopardized, to say the least, if convicted
murderers are permitted to be at large pending the appeal
from their conviction.
The dissenting view appeals to the writer of this review.
Statutory Discriminationin Favorof Women Candidates
The pertinent portion of the Act,2 0 which is the cause of
the interesting question appearing in Lee v. Clark,2 1 is the
provision that:
Not less than three of said consolidated school district
trustees . . . shall be women electors. In the election of
said trustees . . . the three women candidates ... receiving the largest number of votes cast for the women candidates, shall be declared duly elected....
The Act provided that as to the other six trustees to be elected,
those receiving the highest number of votes, whether men or
women, should be declared elected. The suit sought a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of the act, and it was
contended that the provision above noted constituted an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination against the male sex,
rendering the Act violative of the equal protection provisions
in the State and Federal Constitutions. The Court takes note
of the line of cases which uphold acts providing that certain
boards must contain members from opposite political parties,
but it did not consider that such cases were dispositive of the
question before the Court.
The Court said:
Assuming the correctness of the principles enunciated
in the line of cases mentioned relating to proportionate
representation on boards or commissions, they do not control the question before us. The purpose of the challenged
Act is not simply to obtain the composite judgment of men
and women with respect to school problems. There is no
20. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 21-1901.1.

21. 224 S.C. 138, 77 S.E. 2d 485 (1953).
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limitation on the number of women who may be elected.
As to six places on the board, men and women compete on
an equal footing, thus .making it possible to have a board
composed of all women. Whether an act could be sustained
which merely provides for a board of trustees or other
public body consisting of a fixed number of each sex need
not now be decided. This important and far-reaching
question we leave open. The Act here goes much farther
than requiring that a certain proportion of the board
shall be women. It gives them a preferential status at the
polls. The precise question presented is whether in respect to the required votes for election, there may be a
distinction. We think not. If by reason of their sex,
women are, as argued by appellants, more intimately acquainted with the operation of the public schools and have
a closer relation with the teachers and administrative
problems, these are considerations which the voter may
take into account in casting his ballot, but afford no justification for discrimination against male candidates for
school trustee.
Due Processof Law
Several questions were raised and disposed of in State v.
Waitus,22 an unpleasant capital offense case, but the interesting one, from a standpoint of constitutional law, is that which
led our Court to reverse a first degree murder conviction of
the negro defendant, upon the ground that the members of his
race had been systematically excluded from both the grand
jury of Georgetown County, which had indicted him, and from
the petit jury of Marion County, which had tried and convicted him.
Justice Oxner's opinion carefully reviews statutory and constitutional provisions of the South Carolina law relating to the
composition and qualifications of juries. It then reviews the
several holdings of the United States Supreme Court on the
constitutional question, noting that the United States Supreme
Court was the final arbiter in this field and that the state
court was bound by its holdings notwithstanding that its own
views might not be in accord therewith. The Court discusses
the factual situation relating to the exclusion of negroes from
juries in both Marion and Georgetown Counties, and concludes
22. 224 S.C. 12,77 S.E. 2d 256 (1953).
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that the record establishes that they had, in fact, been systematically excluded. It noted that the United States Supreme
Court had reached the conclusion that due process was denied
a negro indicted and tried and convicted under these circumstances. The Federal decisions on the question are collected
and discussed, for which reason the opinion here serves as an
admirable digest of these holdings.
State Police Powerin Interstate Commerce
To one familiar with the crossing involved and the number
of persons killed in crossing accidents at this place, one marvels at the attitude of the railroad company in appealing from
the highly sensible order of the Commission requiring that
the railroad either station a flagman or an automatic flashing
signal at the Liberty Hill Crossing in Charleston County. But
that comment is beside the point. The point raised on appeal
is that the action of the State burdened interstate commerce
in unnecessary fashion. The Court upheld the Commission's
order on the ground that the exercise by the State of its police
power was in all respects justified in order that the public
be safeguarded against a danger.
The only puzzling thing in the subject case, Atlantic Coast
23
Line Railroad Co. v. Public Service Commission of S. C.,
is the fact that the dispute was ever litigated. The principle
of law that a State may exercise its police power in reasonable
fashion, where interstate commerce is involved, is well recognized. Similarly, interstate commerce may not be burdened
unnecessarily under the guise of an exercise of police power.
However, when the average daily number of vehicles using the
crossing on week days was 2,783, of which 263 used the crossing in a single hour, and 14 school buses used the crossing
twice a day, it is hard to justify the railroad company's refusal to safeguard the crossing. The fact that 11 accidents
with 7 fatalities occurred in a period of a few years was a further factor not overlooked by the Court.

23. 81 S.E. 2d 357 (S.C. 1954).
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